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There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered investigating levels of consumption
that appear to be hard to justify. Yet, in the standard moral hazard model withholding of effort by the
agent is not observable to the principal. We argue that this assumption has to be revised in applications
that study corruption. The informativeness of an agent's level of consumption depends on his legal
income and initial level of wealth, as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating
of the principal's belief about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they
are easier to monitor. More generally, we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring
consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications.
We show that when there is consumption monitoring and wealth is observed, the effect of higher wealth
on equilibrium bribes is ambiguous (and that the political class will exhibit lower variance in consumption
than the general population). In settings where formal contracts matter, we show that monitoring consumption
introduces a tendency towards low powered incentives (and more generally low wages). We also discuss













Castrated slaves, called eunuchs, were employed by Sultans to guard their harems. This 
solution to a particularly distressing principal-agent problem is one instance of a general 
strategy that can be called “choosing agents”. In this strategy, the principal selects an agent, 
on whom he is about to delegate a task, based on an observable characteristic. In the 
standard agency model it is clear that the agent’s degree of risk aversion can be costly to the 
principal. Perhaps because of the difficulty in observing risk aversion, few economists have 
emphasized the potential benefits of using particular types of agents. Schelling (1960), for 
example, discusses the use of agents with a low personal cost of conflict and mentions the 
strategic advantages of delegating authority “to a military commander of known motivation”. A 
subsequent paper by Vickers (1985) emphasizes the potential value of hiring a manager that 
is committed to maximize the company’s sales instead of profits. Similarly, Rogoff (1985) 
analyses the benefits of delegating the conduct of monetary policy to a conservative central 
banker in a setting where there is time inconsistency, while Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) 
study how hiring a manager biased towards pursuing certain type of projects (a “visionary”) 
helps employees exert effort on innovative tasks. In all these examples there is a commitment 
benefit of choosing agents with particular preferences. In this paper we focus on the 
contractual benefits of choosing certain agents out of a population with similar preferences. 
The example of the eunuch illustrates an extreme case whereby selecting some agent 
eliminates the principal agent problem altogether.
2 In general, the amount of rents left to the 
agent and/or the efficiency costs of the optimal incentive scheme will depend on the agent’s 
observable characteristics.  
 
We are particularly concerned with applications to corruption. The academic literature on 
corruption has discussed the effects of higher income on the behavior of agents that work in 
positions where there are opportunities to take bribes. This is the theme, for example, of the 
early paper by Becker and Stigler (1974) and the subsequent literature on efficiency wages.
3 
                                                 
2 Note that even though Sultans in the Ottoman Empire could choose different types of eunuchs, those 
preferred for harem service were typically both black and Sandali (i.e., their genitalia were entirely amputated). 
3 See the income satiation model of Rasmusen (1992) and the model with different wage regimes of Besley and 
McLaren (1993). Both present discussions of corruption in an efficiency wage setting whereas Mookherjee and 
Png (1995) present a model of contingent rewards. There is also a large policy literature discussing how paying   3
The idea is appealing because it can be related to the standard economic intuition of 
diminishing marginal utility. There are a number of examples of very wealthy individuals that 
have been elected in countries where corruption is an important political preoccupation. 
One the famous cases is that of Silvio Berlusconi, who was elected prime minister in Italy of 
1994, in the aftermath of tangentopoli, the corruption scandals that shocked the Italian political 
establishment in the early nineties. The owner of a vast business empire, Berlusconi’s 
acknowledged net annual earnings at the time of U$13.5 million. 
 
A second effect of wealth is evident in a large number of corruption cases, however. It is 
illustrated by the actions of the leaders of the popular uprising against President Ferdinand 
Marcos of the Philippines in 1986. After finding a number of luxury items at the presidential 
palace, including 2,300 pairs of shoes in First Lady Imelda Marcos’ closet, they decided to 
protect and exhibit them, together with all of the contents as evidence of corruption on a 
grand-scale by the Marcos’. They reasoned that, since Marcos was not a wealthy man before 
entering politics, these items where probably acquired with dishonest income.
4 Put 
differently, finding 2,300 pairs of shoes in Mrs Berlusconi’s closet, would make her an 
eccentric rather than a crook. Interestingly, this is the logic used in the overwhelming 
majority of the cases where high-level corruption has been detected and punished. As part of 
a mild campaign against corruption in the early 1980’s, the Mexican government charged (in 
absentia) the former chief of police of Mexico City with fraud. One of the reasons for the 
charges was his high standard of living. Apparently he was able to keep 15 racehorses and 19 
vintage cars in his home. He also had 1,200 servants and had a second home modeled (in 
marble) on the Parthenon, all whilst on a U$1,000 monthly salary.
5 The biggest spy scandal 
in the CIA’s history occurred when counter espionage agents inquired how one of their top 
agents, Aldrich Ames, was able to afford a Ferrari. In the end, Ames’ luxurious lifestyle 
prompted an investigation that uncovered the sale of secrets to the Soviet Union on the 
largest scale ever. Amongst these secrets was a list of CIA agents that were subsequently 
                                                                                                                                                 
higher wages can reduce corruption (e.g., World Bank (1997)). The approach is also a favorite with the press. 
For example, wage increases are a part of the effort to reduce corruption in the Mexican federal police. See 
“Reforming Mexico’s police”, The Economist, December 11, 1999. 
4 Ex-President Marcos, however, has denounced claims that he was worth more than U$10bn (based on papers 
found at the palace) as politically motivated fabrications. He has officially declared assets for only U$2bn. See 
The Times, June 12, 1986. 
5 Reported in The Economist, April 7, 1984.   4
killed by the Soviets.
6 According to Judge Gherardo Colombo from Milan, a former 
prosecutor in the “mani pulite” process, the value of monitoring the assets and lifestyles of 
public officials is one of the key lessons of the Italian experience. A paper summarizing the 
main practical issues (Colombo, 1997) goes further and argues that this is the only approach 
with some chance of success.
7 One requirement for this effect to be operational is that the 
principal has some sense of what the agent’s initial level of wealth is, either because we are 
dealing with a known political figure, or because there is access to prior tax payments or 
because there is a declaration of wealth prior to entering office and strategic exaggeration of 
personal wealth is too expensive (for political or tax reasons). 
 
These arguments can be put in terms of the traditional moral hazard model. It suggests that 
applying it to study corruption requires more than a mere re-labeling of effort for bribes 
because withholding effort is unobservable while bribe consumption may be observable in 
some type of agents (the poor or those on very low wages).
8 A direct implication is that there 
may be other quasi-observable characteristics of the agent that may facilitate this 
transmission of information besides their income, such as the agent’s rate of discount. We 
conjecture that agent’s with children, or with sick relatives may be easier to monitor, as they 
would have a higher tendency to consume education and health care services. Although all 
our examples come from corruption settings, it is possible that there are more general 
benefits from using observable characteristics to help reduce informational costs. As an 
example from industrial organization, consider the case of a firm that prefers to collude with 
                                                 
6 Reported in the front page of The Times, December 29, 1994. For another application, see the minutes of the 
Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee December 21, 1999. In it there is a discussion on some 
“missing” funds. After no explanation can be produced, the following exchange takes place: 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Is there any evidence of a surprising rise in standards of living of key people 
involved?  
MR. FISHER. No, there is not.  
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Has somebody looked?  
MR. FISHER. Yes, we have looked into that. Many of the staff people are still at the Bank, though others are 
not. But we have found nothing of that nature. (We thank Ernesto Dal Bo for suggesting this example). 
7 The secret nature of corrupt agreements, the fact the victims (taxpayers) are dispersed and there are incentives 
for free riding in monitoring corruption, the fact that penalties are stipulated to both those receiving bribes and 
those giving them, all conspire to make corruption a crime with extremely low rates of indictments. 
8 Prendergast (2000) emphasizes a number of dimensions in which corruption does not fit well with the 
traditional hidden action agency model, including the difficulty of finding metrics on which to write anti-
corruption contracts. He emphasizes monitoring and investigations (as an alternative to writing incentive 
contracts) and the behavioral responses of the agent. On the combination of monitoring and investigations in 
the enforcement of law, see Mookherjee and Png (1992). See also Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) for a principal   5
a small rather than a large rival because deviations from an agreement by a small firm are 
easier to observe (in some markets).
9 As a potential application in public economics, 
consider the standard problem of trying to figure out the wealth/income of an individual for 
tax purposes. In fact, it is not uncommon in practice for tax authorities to monitor 
consumption in order to make comparisons with sworn fiscal declarations in an inference 
process that is very much related to the one we discuss in this paper.
10 We think that our 
main point is, broadly, an extension of the informativeness principle (see Holmstrom (1979) 
and Shavell (1979)). 
 
In the next section we describe the general problem and a measure of the gain from 
choosing agents and monitoring consumption to lay down the basic ideas. Given that in 
practice high-level politicians typically are bound by informal contracts, whereas lower level 
bureaucrats are motivated through formal incentive schemes, we separate the channels 
through which choosing agents and monitoring consumption matters. First, in the absence 
of a formal contract, monitoring consumption will still lead some type of agents to behave 
better than others. Second, writing a formal incentive contract may be cheaper for some type 
of agents. In section III we study informal contracts and show that under consumption 
monitoring we should not expect  to always have  lower corruption levels with richer 
politicians. We also analyze two extensions: the role of ability and the role of the tax system. 
In section IV we develop the case of formal contracts and show that the observability of 
consumption leads to low powered incentive contracts (there is less separation between the 
wages in the good and in the bad state). This is an argument against paying high wages to 
deter corruption. The main point of the paper naturally leads to a distinction (in terms of 
value to the agent) between money earned legally and money earned illegally, something that 
is assumed in many principal agent models.
11   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
agent model applied to corruption. Gibbons and Waldman (1998) and Prendergast (1999) provide surveys of 
the agency literature. 
9 We thank Hugo Hopenhayn for suggesting this example.  
10 In a recent example, the tax authority in Argentina monitored the identity of those purchasing luxury items, 
such as trips to ski resorts, and those consuming relatively expensive items that are necessities, such as plasma 
TV in the weeks prior to the 2006 Soccer World Cup and assistance to motels (“telos”). They then crossed-
checked these identities with a list of fiscal debtors (see Candelaresi, 2006).   6
II. The Basic Problem of Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption 
 
II.a. Basic Problem 
Assume that a principal wishes to hire an agent to do some task. The agent’s original 
observable characteristic is 
0. i t  The resulting observable characteristic of the agent after the 
implementation of payment scheme r  by the principal is  
0 (,) . ii tt r The principal chooses a 
payment scheme 
* r  and an agent with original characteristic 
0
i t
∗ such that  
 
0* * 0 ,m a x ( , ( , ) ) ip i tr A r g Ur a t r
∗ ∈  where   
00 (, ) m a x ( , ,(, ) ) ia i i atr A r g Ur a ttr
∗ ∈   
 
The principal’s utility,  (.) p U , depends on the payment scheme and the agent’s optimal 
action, a
*. And the agent’s utility   (.) a U  depends on the payment scheme, the agent’s action 
and the resulting characteristic. A way to solve this problem, in the spirit of Grossman and 
Hart (1993), is to find the optimal payment scheme for each type and then choose the 
optimal type. Guided by the empirical applications which involve cases of high level 
(political) corruption as well as low-level (bureaucratic) corruption, we distinguish two 
channels through which the principal benefits from using observable characteristics and 
monitoring consumption. First, even in the absence of a formal contract, some types of 
agents will be more inclined to choose the actions desired by the principal. Second, some 
types of agents will be cheaper to motivate through a formal incentive contract.  
 
To illustrate the first channel, we look for the optimal characteristic assuming that the 
principal cannot choose the formal payment scheme. In this case the solution is such that 
 
 
00 max ( ( )) ip i tA r g U a t
∗∗ ∈      where    
00 () m a x ( ,) ia i at A r g Ua t
∗ ∈   
 
The principal’s utility depends on the agent’s action, while the agent’s utility depends on the 
action and the original characteristic. The lack of formal contracts is common in high level 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See, for example, transaction costs in the agency models of regulatory capture (see, chapter 11 of Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) or the “moral costs” of taking bribes assumed often in the analysis of corruption since Rose-  7
political settings, where corruption is often a preoccupation.
12  
 
To illustrate the second channel, we develop an example with homogeneous agents (same 
original characteristic) where the principal sets a formal contract.  The focus is on the effect 
of the payment scheme on the resulting characteristic and how easy it will be to observe 
consumption. The solution is given by 
 
  max ( , ( , )) pi rA r g U r a t r
∗∗ ∈      where     (, ) m a x (,,) ia i atr A r g Ur a t
∗ ∈   
 
The utility of the principal depends on the payment scheme and the agent’s action. The 
utility of the agent depends on the contract and on the resulting characteristic.
13 
  
II.b. Measure of the Gain from Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption 
In the general case the gains from choosing agents and monitoring consumption to the 
principal is  
 
() ( ) ( )
*0 * *0 ** *0 0 (0) ( ), ( , ) , ( , )
av av
pi i p i i M Ur t a tr Ura t r d G t =− ∫  
 
where r
av is the payment scheme that maximizes principal’s utility given that it cannot be 
made contingent on type, and where 
0 () i Gt  is the cumulative distribution function of types.  
 
In the case where incentive contracts are not used (or are not tailored to each characteristic), 
the gain from choosing agents is  
                                                                                                                                                 
Ackerman (1975). 
12 Note that in this case, there are no benefits originating in the fact that the principal can write a different 
(cheaper) contract for some type of agents, but rather from the fact that some agents are more likely to take a 
desired action. This description includes the case of agents who take actions due to the informal incentives they 
face and cases of agents whose preferences make them select actions that have commitment value (as with 
Rogoff’s conservative central banker; for a study of contracts for central bankers, see Walsh, 1995 ). 
13 In our example, the benefits originate in the fact that a contract that takes into account a (given) 
characteristic and monitors consumption is cheaper for the principal. Different types of agent may be 
associated with differences in benefits, but the two channels are conceptually different. Formal contracts to 
deter corruption are common in bureaucracies, which are often characterized by the use of low powered 
incentive schemes (e.g., Tirole, 1994). And raising wages for bureaucrats is one of the most popular policy 
proposals to fight corruption.    8
 
()( ) ( ) ∫ − =
0 0 * * 0 * ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( i i p i p t dG t a U t a U M  
 
In the case where incentive contracts are tailored to the characteristics of the agent, a 
measure of the gain has two components. First, we have the gain from having a contract that 
fits the characteristic, even though the latter may not be the optimal one. This is given by  
 
() ( ) ( )
*0 *0 * 0 0 *0 0 ( 2) () , (, ) () () , (, )
ii
av av
pi p i i i M aU r t a t r d G t U r t a t rd G t =− ∫∫. 
 
Second, we have the gain from choosing the optimal characteristic.  
 
() ( )
*0 * *0 ** *0 *0 * 0 (2 ) ( ), ( , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) pi i pi i i M b U rt at r U rt atr d G t =− ∫  
 
Note that the gain in the general case,  (0) M , can be quite large. Consider the standard 
problem of inducing an agent to exert effort in a task. Now allow for the possibility that 
agents differ in their skin pigmentation and that the only way to enjoy leisure is to spend 
time under the sun. In this case white agents are to be preferred to black agents, as white 
agents would exhibit sunburns if they were to withhold effort on the job, whereas black 
agents would exhibit no change in color. In this extreme example, the gain from choosing 
agents and monitoring consumption is  (0) M . This is so because using a black agent takes us 
to the traditional principal agent model (with no information from observing consumption) 
and using a white agent takes us to a world where there are no principal agent problems.
14 
 
III. No Contract, Choice of Agent  
 
In this section we consider the possibility of corruption in a setting where formal contracts 
cannot be written (by assumption), so this is an example of only choosing the agent’s 
                                                 
14 More generally, when agents find it very costly to have no leisure at all, the optimal contract will include 
some leisure (besides a monetary payment). Interestingly, it will differ between the two types with white agents 
having relatively less time under the sun than black agents. The reason is that allowing white agents to spend   9
characteristics, as explained in section II. The setup we consider has the advantage of being 
applicable to cases of corruption by high level officials and politicians, an area where there 
has been comparatively little research done. The only thing the public can do is to monitor 
the agent’s consumption patterns, which are affected both by the bribes he takes and by the 
random changes to his wealth.  
 
Consider an agent that is paid a fixed wage (normalized to zero) who has the opportunity to 
choose the amount of bribes b  to take. For concreteness, consider the case of a high level, 
elected politician in charge of privatizing a state enterprise that can under-invoice the sale 
without leaving any proof of wrongdoing.
15  
 
Assume the agent has a stock of wealth t, that produces a flow of honest income freely 
available for consumption, v. While wealth is verifiable, the amount v is not observable to 
the public. A number of factors affect the size of the income realization v, including the 
returns to his legitimate investments and the amount of gifts the agent may receive like 
inheritance. After observing the return to his wealth v, the agent decides to take bribes in 
the amount b , for a total amount of income available of vb + . This is fully spent on 
consumption,  z , as allowing for savings somewhat complicates the analysis without adding 




A standard way to think of z is as consumption on luxury goods, such as spending on fancy 
cars or golden watches. However, successful cases of corruption detection, suggest including 
                                                                                                                                                 
time under the sun is more “expensive” since it would reduce the information that is transmitted to the 
principal when the agent withholds effort. 
15 We do not model the source of the agent’s power because we do not need so much detail to lay down the 
basic ideas. All we need is a situation where the politician can take bribes, and that he has complete legal 
discretion to do so. In other words, the politician runs no risk of detection or of ever receiving any form of 
legal punishments. Although admittedly extreme, the assumption provides a first approximation given the 
extraordinary low rate of detection of (perceived) corruption in practice. The following simple game (keeper of 
the treasure) illustrates. A guard is in charge of protecting the kingdom's treasure from some thieves. After 
these leave with their loot, the guard confronts the king and reports how much was stolen. The king can only 
observe the guard's standard of living before and after the raid, and reward the guard with honors, etc. Note 
that we are not allowing punishment to depend on wealth. This is natural if all punishment is in the form of 
utility, but for pecuniary punishments it is clearly easier to punish the wealthy. Modifying the model in this way 
does not alter the main results.   10
goods on which consumption cannot be postponed. Indeed, as mentioned above, one of the 
lessons of the mani pulite investigations is that the usefulness of monitoring spending 
depends on the discount rate of consumption on the particular activity. Examples of areas 
with high discount rate include  the education of children (particularly in countries where 
there is a large quality gap between private and free public schools) or spending on medical 
care (see Colombo, 1997). This reduces the possibility of having the agent shifting 
consumption across time. Although we assume that there is no (verifiable) trace of the 
agent’s corrupt activities, we do assume the agent’s consumption of luxuries is observable 
(presumably, that is the point with luxury goods). When the public observes these displays of 
wealth, it doesn’t know if the agent was lucky or if he took bribes.
16 Thus, the state of the 
world where the agent takes bribes and inherits nothing is observationally equivalent for the 
public to the state where the agent takes no bribes and receives a shock of legal income (e.g., 
an inheritance). 
 
We assume that the variable v, the return to wealth, is distributed with a certain distribution 
function; that this is common knowledge; and that this induces a distribution function over 
z  that we denote with  () Fz. Call the associated density function  () f z . The agent’s 
objective function is 
 
() (,) I Uz Ftzm =−  
 
The function  (.) U  is the agent’s utility function and we assume it satisfies standard Inada 
conditions, and no restrictions on  (.) F . The second term represents punishment for 
suspicions of corruption. When the public observes the politician’s level of consumption, it 
calculates the probability that such a level was generated with zero bribes. The agent is 
punished by the public with reductions to their moral prestige (in units of utility) in the 
amount  m . A simple interpretation is that  (.) F  is the probability of dishonesty and m  is 
the personal cost of the public’s lack of trust, possibly expressed as the number of votes. 
 
                                                 
16 When asked about his 2,300 pairs of shoes, Marcos can always claim that he inherited money from a relative 
or invested his salary wisely.   11
The timeline is as follows. 
 
choose agent with 
wealth t 
inheritance v  agent chooses bribes b   
public observes consumption z 
payoffs are made 
 
 
First the public chooses a politician from a pool of agents that can only be distinguished by 
their wealth. Second, the random realization to wealth is revealed to the politician. Third, the 
politician chooses a level of bribes and total consumption of luxuries is revealed to the 
public.
17 Lastly, the payoffs to the politician and the public are made. 
 
Agent’s Choice 
The problem for a politician that observes a realization equal to v is to 
 
b Max I  
 
The first order condition is 
 
´( , ) 0 Uf t z m −=  
 
The agent equates the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal punishment for 
exhibiting conspicuous consumption. This punishment is simply the change in the 
probability the agent is considered corrupt times the punishment implied by these beliefs. 
Indeed, since the public cannot see what part of the politician’s consumption pattern 
originates in a genuine wealth realization and what part originates in a bribe, it must punish 
all displays of “excessive” consumption. The agent observes the shock to his wealth and 
decides what the level of bribes he should take is. Note that this may imply a distortion in 
consumption (or what in a small abuse of language we can call “negative bribes”). In normal 
circumstances the agent would certainly consume according to his wealth realization, but his 
                                                 
17 The main conclusions of the paper do not change if the timing is altered to allow the politician to observe 
the wealth realization after deciding on the amount of bribes.    12




Since we are not restricting  (.) F  in any way or form (beyond the standard  (0) 0 F =  and 
()1 F ∞=),  in order to ensure that the solution is an interior one we assume that for all the 
types, there exists a b <∞ such that  () ( ,) ( ) Uv b Ftv bm U m + −+ > ∞ − .
20 Note that the 
conditions on the utility and distribution functions imply that we must have positive bribes 
at  0 v = . Given the sequence of play, bribes are monotonically decreasing in the realization 
of income, v. A more general result, which is also empirically testable, is the political class 
exhibits less variance in the consumption of luxuries than the non-political population. In 
fact, in the extreme example we present the variance is zero (for a given level of wealth). 
This emphasizes that corruption can be seen as insurance, whereas several models in the 
literature see it as a gamble. It is also straightforward to see that if z  is separated into 
different goods, each with a different discount rate, there will be more consumption of 
goods with a high discount rate. 
  
Agent Participation 
The agent’s participation constraint is  
 
() ( )() () ,, ( ) , Uv b Ft v b mft vd v Uvft vd v
∗∗ ⎡⎤ +− + ≥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫  
 
Note that monitoring consumption has the effect of introducing a form of punishment for 
people who choose to enter politics that they would otherwise not have. Accordingly, the 
public has a smaller set of agents from which to elect leaders compared to situations where 
there is no monitoring consumption. We could not obtain general conditions under which 
                                                 
18 The conversation is as follows: 
WIFE: Darling, why don't we go to Cancun for the holidays? You know we can afford it this year as my father 
is paying for it. 
POLITICIAN: I know but, what will the people say? 
19 Calling these activities “negative bribes” is less odd than it seems. Since all the public can see is displays of 
conspicuous consumption, all the distinctions must be made in one plane: we must either have positive and 
negative bribes or positive and negative consumption. What may be misleading is that a “negative bribe”' 
sounds like the agent is returning some ill-gotten gains to the public. No such thing happens in this model. As 
we emphasized, the agent simply engages in a sub-optimal pattern of consumption from a personal point of 
view. 
20 Of course, the first order condition could hold for any number of values of the realization.   13
the constraint affects differently particular groups (e.g., the rich). 
 
On this account, the model predicts that countries with more access to information about 
the lifestyle of politicians would tend to have less people interested in entering politics. For 
example, a practical decision that countries must make is if the statement requiring 
politicians of disclose their wealth prior to entering politics is going to be made public (such 
as in the US) or will not (such as in the UK prior to the 1990’s). Cultural habits that allow 
media enquiry would again have the benefit of monitoring consumption but at the cost of 
reducing the pool of potential politicians. If wealth is not observable, we expect the poor to 
participate more in politics.  
 
Note that if we extend the setup to consider the possibility of some people being always 
honest (i.e., people that always set b=0 regardless of the circumstances), then under 
monitoring consumption the honest would experience a distortion in consumption when 
entering politics. This distortion would always be a reduction in the consumption, and would 
be larger (in expected terms) for the rich (although it would be smaller in utils). The 
following lemma summarizes. 
 
Lemma (bad politicians): Agents that are always honest (i.e., who always set b=0) have fewer 
incentives to enter politics when there is monitoring consumption.  
 
In our particular setup this honest agents would never enter into politics. Note that 
dishonest agents also experience a disincentive to entering in to politics. However, some 




The Public’s Problem 
Faced with this behavior by the agent, the public must choose a politician with a level of 
wealth such that expected bribes are a minimum. The public has very little information 
about the agent’s activities, and its objective function is accordingly simple. The public may 
                                                 
21 On the quality of politicians, see Caselli and Morelli (2004); see also Dal Bo and Di Tella (2003) and Levine, 
Weinschelbaum and Zurita (2006).   14
have a number of specific objectives in mind, but may be unable to combine them 
analytically when designing the optimal compensation package. Thus, concentrating on bribe 
taking is the best it can do. Alternatively, the public may have little information about how 
much uncertainty is faced by the politician, or the agent’s responsibilities could be secret, so 
there is actually no practical way to do this.  
 
Call  1() vt the level of the wealth realization for which we have  1 (( ) ) 0 bvt
∗ = . Then the 
probability of the agent being corrupt is 
 
() () 1 , F tv t  
 




0 ,. . a r g m a x
vt
B bv t ft vbd vs tb I
∗∗ ∗ =+ ∈ ∫  
 




t Min B 
() ( )() () .. , , ( ) ,
argmax








The first constraint is a participation constraint to ensure the agent is willing to take part in 
political life and the second is an incentive constraint. Under the assumption that  (, ) Ftz is 
decreasing in t, (for a given level of consumption the rich are punished less, so there is first 
order stochastic dominance), this leads us to our basic proposition 
 
 
   15
Proposition 1: Under ‘’Monitoring Consumption’’, the relationship between the agent’s wealth and the 
probability that he/she takes bribes (and with the expected total bribes) is: 
1. ambiguous when the public can observe the agent’s wealth 
2. negative when the public cannot observe the agent’s wealth 
 
Proof:  
1. The expressions for both  1 (, () )/ dF t v t dt  and  / dB dt  cannot be signed.  
2. When the public cannot observe wealth F(t,z)=F(z) for all t, then the level of consumption 
* z  would be the same for all types. This means that poorer agents would be getting more 
bribes (both in size and frequency).  ■ 
 
Agent wealth, when is publicly observed, affects bribe taking in our simple model in two 
ways. First, richer agents tend to take lower bribes because of diminishing marginal utility. 
Second, a higher level of wealth reduces the punishment for conspicuous consumption, 
because the latter is less indicative of malfeasance. Proposition 1 shows that, from the point 
of view of controlling corruption, there is no reason to prefer richer agents when the public 
can observe the wealth of the politician; while when wealth is not observed the public always 
does better when it hires a richer agent. In other words, when the rich can hide better the 
bribes they have obtained they will tend to bribe more, which paired with diminishing 
marginal utility of income means that the level of agent wealth that minimizes bribes 
becomes an empirical question.  
 
The first part of proposition 1 may not be very surprising given that we have not imposed 
strong restrictions on  (.) F . However, most reasonable assumptions leave this result 
unchanged. This is the case if we assume, for instance, that the variance of income increases 
with wealth.
22 This is what we expect to happen if we think that the income generated by a 
certain amount of wealth is a fixed percentage term of the original amount, such as when we 
can express returns as plus or minus x%. It is also possible to think of the v term as 
inheritance. Then this assumption is equivalent to assuming that wealth is correlated across 
family members (e.g., rich people have rich aunts).    16




Up to now we have assumed that the public’s problem is simply to minimize expected 
bribes. This simplification obscures the fact that the choice of politician will often depend 
on other factors, including the perceived ability of the politician. This is important because it 
is unlikely that, in general, ability and wealth are independently distributed. In this extension 
we consider politicians who differ in terms of ability and that (at least some form of) ability 
is valuable to the public. 
 
When ability is observable, the principal’s problem is simply extended to take into account 
the benefits and costs of selecting on ability. Consider two dimensions of ability, a1 and a2, 
and a more general welfare function that depends on the amount of bribes and the ability of 
the politician.   
12 (, , ) SW B a a  
 
To fix ideas, consider the case of ability a1 which allows the politician to induce a higher 
GDP and ability a2 that allows the politician to improve the functioning of the state (for 
example, on how to reduce tax evasion). The archetype of the first case would be US 
billionaire Bill Gates, who presumably would invent new directions in which to take the 
country. And the archetype of the second type would be Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, who 
presumably has such an intimate knowledge of government failure that he would know how 
to reform it. With a large State it is likely that the gains from type 2 ability are large. Note 
one complication: when the State is large there are likely large gains from reforming and 
improving the administration of government, but it is also likely that the distribution of 
abilities amongst the existing rich in that country is dominated by type 2 ability. 
 
The welfare function SW(.) is the reduced form of all these effects. When ability is 
observable, the problem is to  
                                                                                                                                                 
22 If we do not assume this we may have that agents that are worth $10 may have $9 in a bad year and $11 in a 
good year, but an agent worth $1,000 is worth $1,001 in a good year and $999 in a bad one. 
23 We thank a referee for suggesting this extension.   17
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Note that the distribution of the wealth realization f(t, 12 , aa,v) depends on the pair of 
abilities, so the optimal level of wealth, t, would depend on the ability pair  12 , aa chosen. 
One way to solve this problem is in two steps, in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1983). 
First, find the optimal wealth for each pair of abilities ( 12 , aa). And then choose the optimal 
pair of abilities.  
 
When ability is not directly observable, and this is the more interesting case, our calculations 
need to take into account the fact that we want to choose wealth to minimize bribe taking, 
but that now wealth might be standing in for ability which may also have value.  
  
One extreme case is that of ability not directly observable but fully independent of wealth. 
Consider the case of a politician with inherited wealth, and assume (somewhat 
counterfactually) that the intergenerational transmission correlation of ability within the 
family is zero. In this case, wealth says very little about ability. Thus, for inherited wealth we 
are back to our original problem where we only focus on the consequences of wealth for 
monitoring bribe taking.  
 
In less extreme cases, it would be important to know what type of ability is correlated with 
wealth. In a country with a small State (low level of government spending over GDP) and 
where the rich are likely associated with Schumpeterian wealth creation, it is more likely that 
the wealth of a self made politician is standing in for ability of type 1 (a1). This is not certain, 
so the public will select wealth keeping in mind that different levels of wealth give rise to 
different distributions of abilities.  
 
A realistic possibility is that we can tell precisely the sector of the economy where the self 
made person made his or her money. Ability is still not directly observable, but we now 
know the type of ability most likely to prevail in the sector. Consider the case of a sector   18
where firms exclusively sell to the government; or the utilities (where government regulation 
is key for profitability). Presumably, in these sectors type 2 ability (a2) prevails, including 
knowledge of how the State operates (and how abuses can be curved), but (and this is a 
difference with type 1) it may also mean possessing the ability to understand the bribing 
technology, or to be less condemning in moral terms of dishonest activities. This second 
component of type 2 ability may certainly be positively correlated with wealth but have a 
negative value for society, so the public should use this information when choosing the 
politician.
24 This is a new application of the general principle that we present in the paper, 
namely using observable characteristics to reduce informational costs of controlling 
corruption. In this case the information available is not only the wealth of the individuals but 
also the way that they have earned this wealth.  
 
Note, that ability matters even when the public’s objective is just to minimize bribe taking 
(and no considerations of how ability affects social welfare are needed). To see this, consider 
an able businessperson who creates a trust to manage his/her affairs that is biased towards 
investment in good projects. This means that the distribution of returns for a given wealth, 
will be more “skewed to the right” when ability is higher, and a display of conspicuous 
consumption by the rich (and able) politician is going to be less punished by the public. 
Formally,  12 (, , , ) Fta a z is decreasing in both a1 and a2 , (for a given level of consumption 
the more able are punished less, so there is first order stochastic dominance). Under bribe 
minimization as the sole objective of the principal, the following proposition summarizes the 
effect of ability: 
 
 
Proposition 2: Under ‘’Monitoring Consumption’’, and when the public can observe the agent’s wealth, 
the relationship between the agent’s ability and the probability that he/she takes bribes (and with the 
expected total bribes) is: 
1. ambiguous when the public can observe the agent’s ability 
2. negative when the public cannot observe the agent’s ability 
                                                 
24 Some of the reservations to Silvio Berlusconi becoming Prime Minister of Italy in 1994 could be interpreted 
in this light, as his companies have been accused of bribe paying to reduce the tax burden. Note that such an   19
 
Proof:  
1. The expressions for  121 12 1 (, , , (, , ) )/ dF t a a v t a a da , 121 12 2 (, , , (, , ) )/ dF t a a v t a a da ,   1 / dB da  
and  2 / dB da cannot be signed. 
2. When the public cannot observe the agent’s ability F(t,a1,a2,z)=F(t,z) for all t, then the level 
of consumption 
* z  would be the same for all ability types. This means that less able agents 
would be getting more bribes (both in size and frequency).    ■ 
 
The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. In particular part 2 is obtained because 
consumption will not depend on ability, so those with lower ability will be taking higher 
bribes. 
  
III. b. Taxes 
Up to now we have not allowed for strategic manipulation of the wealth information that 
agents make available to the public prior to taking office. In many countries there are 
provisions whereby agents must make a formal statement of their wealth upon taking a job 
in the public sector (above a certain job category, usually starting with political 
appointments). One debate, with which we do not really concern ourselves, is whether such 
statements of wealth should be made public (e.g., on the web), or made available to anyone 
in the public after a written request (and usually under strict limitations on how this 
information can be used by the person requesting the information), or never be made public 
(but still be used by the authorities in charge of controlling corruption). For the purposes of 
this paper, we simply note that politicians can jam the process of signal extraction when we 
monitor consumption that we describe by declaring to be already wealthy when entering 
public office, presumably at some cost.
25 
 
It is assumed that this cost is increasing in the income tax rate. Declaring prior wealth may 
                                                                                                                                                 
accusation is directly relevant to our model as the ability to hide firm revenues from the tax authorities is likely 
related to the ability to hide bribe income from the public   
25 This cost does not only include taxes. Indeed, the public may insist in actually observing conspicuous 
consumption prior to entering politics and the agent may be liquidity constrained (obviously it would be hard 
to fund such investment projects in the formal finance sector). Then a suboptimal pattern of consumption 
would result (the politician would drive a Ferrari, yet eat cheap meals at home).   20
be costly in terms of tax obligations and this would clearly depend on the tax rates.
26 To 
illustrate this effect in a simple way (but see below for a discussion), we note that a higher 
income tax rate is associated with an improved capacity to monitor agents, so that there is a 
cost C(.) of taking a bribe of size b, which is increasing in the tax rate. A higher income tax 
rate implies a higher cost of bribes just like any other income. But it also implies that tax 
agents are more skilled in going over fiscal data, and are able to verify the accuracy of 
income claims given their experience with deductions and other fiscal data (in brief, we are 
claiming that there are benefits associated with what is called the fiscal burden by Hall and 
Rabushka, 1995). Thus, we assume C’>0 and C’’>0 in  
 
() (,) ( ) I Uz Ftzm Cb r =− −  
 
 
Proposition 3: Under ‘’Monitoring Consumption’’, when the public can observe the agent’s wealth, the 
relationship between the income tax rate and the probability that an agent (of a given wealth) takes bribes 
(and with the expected total bribes) is negative. 




Cb r b rC b r
dbdr
′′ ′ = −− < . Note that this not only implies 
that the local optimum shift to lower bribes, for each level of v, but also that for every level 
bribe higher than b
* the reduction of I is higher than for b
* which means that the level of 
bribes would never increase when r increases.     ■ 
 
The possible value of proposition 3 is that it shows that even when we maintain the position 
that no restrictions on the shape of F(.) are a priori reasonable, assuming C’’>0, which is 
realistic, is sufficient to deliver definite predictions regarding the effect on corruption.
27  
 
                                                 
26 One could question that agents have such extended planning horizons. However, the experience of Indira 
Gandhi’s chief Minister in the State of Maharashi (Mr Antulay) suggests otherwise. Apparently, he was forced 
to resign after a high court in Bombay found him guilty of selling cement quotas established by the 
government. The mechanism used was to ask for “donations” to the trusts he controlled. He “had established 
seven trusts, ostensibly for public purposes, but in fact completely controlled by himself. He had obtained income tax exemptions for 
one trust amounting to U$110m over the next three years - an indication of the amount he expected generous donors to contribute'' 
(reported in p. 51 of The Economist, January 23, 1982). 
27 The results also hold when C(.) is linear and even for some concave functions. But note that it is natural to 
assume convexity at the point where extra corruption triggers auditing/punishment.    21
Of course, one could question the reduced form approach of capturing the economic 
interactions with the C(.) function in the objective of the agent. Indeed, a full 
characterization should allow for strategic manipulation of the wealth declaration and a 
discussion (with hopefully some evidence) on exactly when it is in their careers that 
politicians typically declare their wealth levels. One extreme assumption is that after elected 
(under some distribution of types) the agent can present evidence of being a particular type 
at some cost (e.g., by presenting tax declarations and payments for previous years). The costs 
of fabrication  of such evidence is increasing in the tax rate, exactly as in C(.) above, but now 
we would need to model the optimal declaration of wealth as well, and the optimal selection 
of agents when the public knows that such jamming is possible ex post.
28 This has several 
complications, but in general it can be shown that the higher tax rate reduces the ability of 
the agent to be corrupt. Note that this affects the optimal tax structure that countries will 
choose. Indeed, countries often choose a combination of consumption taxes (like VAT) and 
personal income taxes. Given that we are pointing towards a possible added benefit of 
having personal income taxes for the control of political corruption, we expect that the 
optimal tax structure to be tilted towards personal income taxes (at least with respect to 
situations where corruption is not a consideration).  
 
Finally, note the importance of incomplete credit markets for our argument to be relevant in 
some rich countries. In the US, top politicians sometimes become celebrities after leaving 
office, often writing memoirs for large sums of money. For example, in December 2000, the 
press reported that Simon & Schuster agreed to pay Hillary Clinton a reported $8 million 
advance for a memoir of her years as First Lady.
29 If politicians could get such fees in 
advance (on the date they start office), electing a poor politician would be similar to electing 
a rich one since the former would be able to explain any conspicuous consumption with 
such fee advances by the publishing houses.  
 
                                                 
28 Note that when personal income taxes rise and the capacity of the tax agency improves, it becomes 
impossible for the agent to use bribe proceeds. In such countries, honesty would not be a product of lack of 
corruption inclinations but of an inability to use bribe income due to perfect consumption monitoring.  
29 In some cases politicians could increase the value of such documents. See, for example, the case of Pakistani 
President Prevez Musharraf, who refused to answer a question at a press conference he was hosting during his 
official State visit to the US (together with US President George W. Bush) citing a contract for his memoirs   22
IV. Optimal Contract, Same Agent 
 
In this section we study the role of formal contracts. This has some relevance because 
improving the salaries of public officials is often emphasized as a way to fight corruption.
30 
The main argument in these debates is the same emphasized by economists, namely that 
bureaucrats will not engage in risky activities, such as bribe taking, when there is a wage 
premium to working in the public sector (see, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974), 
Dickens et al (1989), Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), inter alia; for 
the cross country empirical evidence see van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)). For an analysis 
of the potential behavioral responses to an exclusive reliance on anti-corruption 
investigations, see Prendergast (2000).   
 
This policy, however, has problems. For example, for plausible parameter values, wages 
would have to be extremely high to deter corruption (see, for example, Besley and McLaren, 
1993). This is due to a combination of the very low detection probabilities on crimes of 
bribery and the large amounts of money that can potentially be embezzled by the 
bureaucrats. In practice, there are very few examples of countries where politicians earn the 
kind of money that could deter corruption on this logic.
31 One possible reason is that a 
policy of high wages for politicians does not carry much favor with the public. The rhetoric 
suggests this resistance originates in fairness considerations, and it is worth remembering 
that a stylized fact of bureaucracies, which are more insulated from the public than elected 
politicians, is the low power of incentive schemes (for discussions and explanations see, for 
example, Wilson (1989), Tirole (1994), Prendergast (2000) and Besley and Ghatak (2004)). 
 
In this section we point to another practical problem with a formal contract that gives out 
generous monetary rewards to politicians, namely that it makes monitoring consumption 
                                                                                                                                                 
with Simon & Schuster as the reason he couldn't go any further into details of his past conversations with 
members of the Bush Administration. 
30 Although we focus on contracts where agents are remunerated based on the revenues they gather, as applied 
to some parts of the civil service (notably tax collection), a similar point can be made using flat wages and 
dismissal as punishment for engaging in corrupt activities.  
31 The country that pays highest wages to high level politicians appears to be Singapore, which does not rank 
well in civic liberties (according to Freedom House). In 1994, for example, it was reported that the annual 
salary of Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's prime minister, was $780,000, almost four times that of Bill Clinton.   23
difficult. To illustrate, we derive the optimal payment scheme when higher consumption 
levels provide information about the agent’s hidden action and compare it to the contract in 
the standard case where the agent’s subsequent consumption is uninformative. To 
emphasize the main point on how formal contracts change when consumption is 
informative, we now assume that agents are homogeneous in terms of type (e.g., wealth, etc). 
Note that a similar point can be made in the context of a model where payments cannot be 
state contingent. Indeed, in an efficiency wage model, the observability of consumption leads 
to lower wages and to more investment by the principal in increasing the detection 
probability (results available upon request). The intuition is that, when consumption is not 
observable, the cost of increasing the wage one dollar is just this dollar. But when high wages 
reduce the informativeness of monitoring consumption there is an additional cost from the 
reduction in the probability of detection. We start with the standard case where the principal 
does not observe consumption ex-post, which also serves as the benchmark. 
 
IV.a. No Information in Consumption (benchmark)  
The principal offers the agent a contract. If he accepts, his task is to observe the realization 
of a variable (say the level of revenue) Π, which can be high  h Π  (with probability  h p ) or 
low  l Π  (with probability  l p ). He then makes a report 
a Π . The agent’s only discretion 
occurs when the state is high, as he may report it is low (and keep the difference). The 
alternative occupation earns him  0 w . The incentive scheme used by the principal is 
()
a
hh ww Π= Π =  and  ()
a
ll ww Π= Π = . When the principal does not observe 
consumption, the agent will report the truth when  () ( ) hl h l Uw Uw ≥+ Π − Π . And will agree 
to participate when  () ( ) ( ) 0 hhll p Uw p Uw Uw +≥ . 
 
Denote  (.) ψ  the inverse of U. Since U is an increasing and concave function, it is easy to see 
that both constraints hold with equality, so the optimal incentive contract satisfies  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Starting annual salaries for cabinet ministers were $419,285 (over three times that of UK prime minister at the 


















IV.b. Observing Consumption  
To model the fact that consumption is informative, we assume that there is some noise in 
the agent’s level of legal income. For example, the agent invests his wage and bribes and 
earns a random return.
32 This is given by  
 
income φ×  
 
where  φ  is the realization of random variable Φ. To emphasize this, we alter the timing 
(with respect to the one used in section III) and assume that the agent makes his decision to 
become corrupt prior to observing the realization of this random variable. A second 
difference is that we now assume that the agent must consume his total income. Thus, he 
cannot hide the bribe and must consume it under the eyes of the public. Neither of these 
assumptions is essential but help simplify the exposition. The probability that the agent has 
taken bribes is derived given the agent’s legal income and observed consumption level, and 
he is punished for such suspicions with a punishment m. Thus, total punishment is given by  
 
(, ) F legal income consumption m ×  
 
where the first term is the probability that 
consumption
legal income
Φ≤ . The agent’s utility is 
 
() () () , U total income F legal income total income m φφ −  
 
Thus, the timing is  











wages are paid 













When the agent observes  h Π  , the incentive compatibility constraint is  
 
[( ) ( , )] [( ( ) ) (,( ) )] h h h lhl l lhl Uw F w w m d U w F w w m d φ φφ φ φ φ −≥ + Π − Π − + Π − Π ∫∫  
 
Comparing the optimal payment scheme when we can monitor consumption versus when 
we cannot, we obtain the following proposition,  
 
 
Proposition 4: The optimal contract when there is monitoring consumption has lower power than the 
optimal contract in the benchmark case when there is no consumption monitoring. 
 
Proof: We can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as follows 
 
  [ ( ) ( ( ))] [ ( , ) ( , ( ))] hl h l h h l l h l Uw U w d m F w w F w w d φ φφ φ φφ −+ Π − Π ≥ − + Π − Π ∫∫  
 
When this constraint is not binding, the principal gives the agent a constant wage that 
minimizes expected costs (as the agent is risk averse and punishment through m  is enough 









⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +Π −Π
Φ≤ − Φ≤ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦ ∫  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Results do not change if the agent is not allowed to invest the bribe income.    26












 and the probability 
is an increasing function. (The reason is thatΦ, the realization of the uncertainty about the 
agent’s legal income, is independent of the agent’s behavior, and because for any realization, 
the public’s punishment is higher when the agent announces  l Π ). The left hand side is also 
less than zero and  hl h l ww −< Π − Π .     ■ 
 
In other words, when there is monitoring consumption the optimal incentive contract is 
characterized by a difference in wages that is smaller than ( ) hl Π −Π , which is the 
difference in the standard case when consumption is not monitored.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that both our applications point out to a distinction between legal 
and illegal income. A large literature in economics (crime, principal agent models, etc) 
assumes the existence of a “cost” from misbehaving (relative to the norms of society or 
from what the principal expects).
33 We emphasize this by showing that illegal income is less 
valuable than legal income. To see this, and following the notation of the model for state 
contingent contracts for simplicity, we note that the utility of the agent when he reports the 
state as low when it is in fact high is  
 
() ( ) () , () lhl l lhl Uw F ww m φφ +Π −Π − +Π −Π  
 





,( ) ,( )
lhl lhl lhl
ll h l l h ll h l
Uw F w w m
Fw w Fw w m
φφ
φφ
+Π −Π − +Π −Π +Π −Π −
+Π −Π − +Π −Π +Π −Π ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 
 
                                                 
33 In some corruption applications the payoff from dishonesty typically includes a bribe but also a negative 
term often labeled a “moral cost” (see, Rose-Ackerman, 1975). The connection between morality and 
incentives, however, is unappealing because sometimes incentives are not aligned properly for very large groups 
of people and it would be strange to claim that their actions are not moral. Put differently, even if the 
incentives in Argentina and Sweden were such that a majority (minority) of people in Argentina (Sweden) are 
corrupt, few would seriously claim that there are more good people in Sweden.    27
The first two terms are the utility units that the agent would get for a given level of income if 
this had all been earned legally. The third term (in squared brackets) is the difference in 
punishment because the income coming from illegal sources appears suspicious. Note that 
since  (.) F  is decreasing in the first argument, the term in squared brackets is positive, which 
proves our claim.  
 
Note that legal income increases the agent’s utility through two channels. First, we have the 
standard effect operating through higher consumption. Second, higher income reduces the 
popularity penalty because a given level of consumption is less likely to originate in 




There are numerous examples of cases where corruption is discovered because an agent was 
observed to enjoy an unexpectedly high standard of living, or, more precisely, a level of 
consumption that could not be easily explained given the information available about the 
agent’s level of wealth. This suggests that there are potential benefits from designing 
incentive contracts and choosing agent type with the idea of using the information that is 
obtained from monitoring consumption.  
 
There are (at least) two basic effects of hiring agents on a high income arising either because 
of high personal income or because of a generous compensation. On the one hand, bribe 
offers are less tempting to the rich due to diminishing marginal utility. On the other, high 
levels of income also make an observed level of consumption less informative about any 
bribes the agent might have taken. We discuss the general incentive problem of choosing 
agents and monitoring consumption, as well as two applications to settings where corruption 
is common. The first is a setting where informal incentive contracts are prevalent, such as 
the control of a high level politician by the public. Our basic result is that when there is 
consumption monitoring and wealth is observed there is a tendency to choose poorer 
politicians to reduce corruption. It can also be shown that the political class is expected to 
exhibit lower variance in consumption; that there is higher value in monitoring the 
consumption of goods with high discount rates (such as education or health care); and that   28
the gains from monitoring consumption and selecting agents according to wealth depend on 
the level of taxes in the country as well as on the relationship between wealth and ability.  
  
The second setting concerns the control of potentially corrupt bureaucrats through formal 
incentive contracts. In this case, paying generous wages has problems beyond the fiscal cost 
because it lowers the value of monitoring consumption. We show that, when state 
contingent contracts are used, the power of incentive schemes is lower. This is one possible 
explanation for why we often observe low powered incentive contracts in bureaucracies. The 
argument can be applied to wages that are not state contingent, such as efficiency wages. In 
this case monitoring consumption introduces a tendency for lower wages (and higher 
investment in detection), something that is one way of explaining popular resistance to pay 
politicians very high wages. Finally, our analysis provides one way of to assess the value of 
illegal income to a corrupt agent.    29
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